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The Objectives of Science1
David Miller
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick UK
Résumé : Contestant l’opinion commune selon laquelle le problème de la dé-
marcation, contrairement au problème de l’induction, est relativement anec-
dotique, l’article soutient que le critère poppérien de falsifiabilité donne une
réponse irrésistible à la question de savoir ce qui peut être appris d’une invest-
igation empirique. Tout découle du rejet de la logique inductive, joint à la
reconnaissance du fait que, avant d’être investiguée, une hypothèse doit être
formulée et acceptée. Les hypothèses scientifiques n’émergent ni a posteriori
comme les inductivistes le soutiennent, ni de quelque immaculée source a
priori : elles sont des conjectures pures et simples. Les empiristes qui rejettent
l’apriorisme ont donc rejoint trop rapidement les rangs non philosophiques
du naturalisme épistémologique. L’article conclut par un résumé de l’objec-
tivisme popperien et par de brèves réponses à certains arguments à la mode
selon lesquels la vérité objective n’est pas un objectif atteignable.
Abstract: Contesting the common opinion that, unlike the problem of induc-
tion, the problem of demarcation is of little significance, the paper maintains
that Popper’s criterion of falsifiability gives an irresistible answer to the ques-
tion of what can be learnt from an empirical investigation. Everything follows
from the rejection of inductive logic, together with the recognition that, be-
fore it can be empirically investigated, a hypothesis has to be formulated and
accepted. Scientific hypotheses emerge neither a posteriori, as inductivists
1This paper derives from a lecture given at the Popper Centennial Symposium
held at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA on 22nd to 23rd November
2002, and at the Colloque Karl Popper : Philosophe du vingtième siècle
held at the Sorbonne on 16th to 17th December 2002. It has been revised more than
once since 2002, and an extended version has appeared as [Miller 2006a, Chapter 4].
Some changes of emphasis made here were stimulated by correspondence with Diego
Rosende and with Darrell Rowbottom, whom I thank.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 11 (1), 2007, 21–43.
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hold, nor from some immaculate a priori source, but from sheer guesswork.
Empiricists who reject apriorism have therefore enlisted too zealously in the
unphilosophical ranks of epistemological naturalism. The paper concludes with
a summary of Popper’s objectivism, and with brief responses to some fashion-
able arguments that objective truth is not an attainable objective.
1 Introduction
In this paper I should like to set out as clearly and unassumingly as
I can the main points of Karl Popper’s revolutionary theory of scientific
method and of scientific knowledge, to explain what is revolutionary
about it, and to suggest that it resolves a number of current intellectual
controversies over which, to be quite candid, some people have got into
something of a pickle. Many readers may regard such a paper as otiose.
They may mention that Popper’s distinctive views in the methodology
of science have been so frequently discussed that there can be nothing
of value to add, approvingly or disapprovingly. The subject, they may
insist, has long since moved on to problems far removed from Popper’s
central preoccupations, the logical problem of induction and the problem
of demarcation.
This censure might be appropriate if, in addition to being well known,
Popper’s falsificationism were always well understood. I think that its
leading ideas have been repeatedly misrepresented, and that its lessons
have been clumsily distorted. There is, in particular, no adequate re-
cognition of how far beyond the philosophy of science Popper’s deve-
loped epistemological views extend. A characteristic recent judgement,
that ‘Popper’s epistemology is almost exclusively the epistemology of
scientific knowledge’ [Vickers 2006, § 4.2] is hardly at all supported by
the supporting quotation from [Popper 1959, Preface] : ‘most problems
connected with the growth of our knowledge must necessarily transcend
any study which is confined to common-sense knowledge as opposed to
scientific knowledge’. Popper is routinely categorized as a philosopher
of science and politics, who admittedly had interests in a multitude of
other areas, and it is not appreciated that critical rationalism, the gener-
alization of falsificationism first sketched in [Popper 1945, Chapter 24,
§§ iif.], coupled with the biological and objective approach sketched in
[Popper 1972, Chapters 2–4], renders obsolete the traditional, but still
obtusely prevalent, characterization of human knowledge as something
along the lines of justified true belief [Miller 1994, Chapter 3.1]. This
no doubt explains why Popper is still hardly known as an epistemologi-
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st, and his name does not appear in many anthologies on epistemology.
(Compare the comments in [Popper 1972, Chapter 2.5] about Churchill’s
contributions to epistemology.)
Although I have no doubt that Popper made a contribution of lasting
importance to the methodology of science, and to the theory of know-
ledge, I am not disposed here to tip the balance completely in the other
direction. It is impossible that everything that he said about human
knowledge was correct, if only because he contradicted himself on a
number of central issues ; not only, as we all do, through reconsidera-
tion, but because he sometimes approached the same problem from dif-
ferent angles, and unduly emphasized some of its features at the expense
of contrasting ones. These inconsistencies need to smoothed out and
rendered as harmless as possible. But the Spanish writer Unamuno was
surely right when he remarked that ‘[i]f a man never contradicts himself
this must be because he never says anything’.2 Popper could scarcely be
accused of such obmutescence.
Popper’s first significant contributions to the theory of scientific me-
thod and to the philosophy of science are contained in his book Die
beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie [Popper 1979] (The Two
Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge), which was written
at the beginning of the 1930s. An English translation is still awaited.
Yet it was not until the appearance of Logik der Forschung [Popper
1934], a kind of half-brother of its predecessor, that the subversiveness
of Popper’s message was declared. Even then it was not fully recognized,
although the book was much praised, both strongly and faintly. Popper
set out to eradicate much that was traditionally accepted, and much
that was contemporarily endorsed, in discussions of the procedures of
science, and to replace the debris with a theory capable of surmounting
all the problems at which earlier theories had stumbled. In one sense his
proposal — that Plato was wrong to seek to distinguish knowledge from
true opinion, and even more helplessly wrong to recommend knowledge,
rather than simple truth, as the goal of inquiry — is simplicity itself.
The fact remains that for 70 years most philosophers have had a hard
time understanding its subtlety and strength, and few have welcomed its
redemptive force.
2‘Si un hombre nunca se contradice, será porque nunca dice nada.’ Unamuno’s
words (‘from conversation’) are used as the motto to Chapter 7 of [Schrödinger 1944].
I have simplified his translation. An even freer translation is given by [Moore 1989,
359]. The bon mot may be compared with a remark made by Edward John Phelps
in a speech to the Mansion House in London on 24th January 1899 (quoted in The
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd edition, 1979, 373 : 7) : ‘The man who makes
no mistakes does not usually make anything.’
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The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge in
Popper’s title are the problem of induction and the problem of the de-
marcation of empirical science from what is not science : metaphysics,
logic and mathematics, pseudoscience. In the next section I shall explain
Popper’s solutions to these problems. My remarks thereafter will concen-
trate on two aspects of his philosophy of science : the first is the fact
that it is indeed a philosophy of science, not a natural history of science ;
the second is its objectivism. On the way I shall say something about its
rationalism too.
2 Induction and Demarcation
The problem of induction is identified these days, especially by Baye-
sian writers such as [Rosenkrantz 1977, 48], with the problem of how we
can learn from experience. The problem of demarcation may be stated
roughly as the problem of what we can know through experience. The
significance that he attached to these problems reveals the origins of
Popper’s work in traditional empiricism, the doctrine that it is through
experience that we learn about the world. But he was never a whole-
hearted devotee of empiricism, and was from the start, or even earlier,
critical of the tradition. In Logik der Forschung [Popper 1934, § 10] he
wrote that ‘the main problem of philosophy is the critical analysis of the
appeal to the authority of experience’, which amounts to a succinct joint
statement of the problems of induction and demarcation, a statement
whose context shows that he was quite dissatisfied with the traditional
empiricist response to these problems. I shall later say more about this
passage. For the moment I wish to make it clear that, despite many pas-
sages in Popper’s writings that may suggest the contrary, both problems
concern not only scientific knowledge, but all knowledge that may be
characterized as empirical.
In the opening section of Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnis-
theorie [Popper 1979] Popper stated that the problem of demarcation,
the problem of what we can know, which he attributed to Immanuel
Kant, is more fundamental than the problem of induction, the problem
of how we can learn, which Kant had attributed to Hume. He wrote : ‘The
problem of demarcation deserves our primary interest. . . . it proves to be
the central problem to which probably all other questions of the theory of
knowledge, including the problem of induction, can be reduced.’ Popper
held this view for many years ; for example in a 1953 lecture (published in
1957), shortly after saying that ‘the two problems — of demarcation and
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of induction — [are] . . . in a sense one’, he suggested that ‘the problem
of induction is only an instance or facet of the problem of demarcation’
[Popper 1957, §§VIIIf.]. Yet in the Preface to [Popper 1959] (the English
translation of [Popper, 1934]) he made the announcement — it is much
more than a suggestion — that ‘[t]he central problem of epistemology
has always been and still is the problem of the growth of knowledge’, a
formulation that appears to emphasize the dynamic process of learning
at the expense of the static state of knowledge. We may well wonder
which poses the deeper difficulty : induction, which is recognized by all
genuine philosophers as a genuine problem, or demarcation, which has
been dismissed as verbal (by [McGinn 2002, 50] and others), and as ‘a
distraction’ (by [Haack 2005, S69]).
Hume’s problem of induction is a genuine problem because it identi-
fies a contradiction at the heart of the empiricist tradition. What, Hume
asked, can we legitimately learn about the unknown from what we have
experienced ; what can we learn, for example, about the future or about
what happens in general ? Nothing, he said. In [Hume 1738, Book I, Part
III, §xii] he wrote (in a passage quoted in part in [Popper 1972, Chapter
2.26]) :
Let men be once fully persuaded of these two principles, that
there is nothing in any object, considered in itself, which can
afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it ; and,
that even after the observation of the frequent or constant
conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any infer-
ence concerning any object beyond those of which we have had
experience ; I say, let men be once fully convinced of these two
principles, and this will throw them so loose from all common
systems, that they will make no difficulty of receiving any,
which may appear the most extraordinary.
‘These principles’ Hume continued ‘we have found to be sufficiently
convincing’. In short, however plentiful and varied our experience, there
is no reason to predict or to infer any one thing rather than another
concerning what we have not experienced. Hume demonstrated that the
method of induction, the supposed method of extrapolating or general-
izing from experience, is rationally indefensible.
The problem of demarcation, on the other hand, arises only indirectly
from a contradiction. Kant had argued in his Antinomies that, outside
the empirical realm, cogent reasoning risks plunging us into uncoven-
anted and unforeseeable error. To protect ourselves from again commit-
ting such errors, it is urgent that we map out the realm of the empirical,
and not step beyond it.
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The problem of demarcation, though not often addressed explicitly
by empiricists, was traditionally solved by the obvious expedient of id-
entifying the empirical with the deliverances of sense experience toge-
ther with what can be obtained from them by induction. Once Hume
had exposed the fatal weaknesses of the empiricist theory of induction,
therefore, the empiricist theory of demarcation became irrevocably im-
plicated. They were in the same jam, and only together could they be
rescued. Popper was quite right to say that, at least for empiricists, the
two problems — of demarcation and of induction — [are] . . . in a sense
one’, and that ‘the problem of induction is only an instance or facet of
the problem of demarcation’ (quoted above). Within traditional empiri-
cism, it is only when the problem of induction has been solved that the
problem of demarcation can be solved.
Matters look different when we come to Popper’s own solution of
these problems, for with the rejection of inductive logic, ‘the problem
of demarcation gains in importance’ [Popper 1959, § 4]. The problem of
demarcation has indeed to be solved first, and only subsequently can the
problem of induction be solved. The explanation of this change of empha-
sis is rather simple : whereas traditional empiricism held that knowledge
consists of what is learnt (from experience), Popper decisively separated
the categories of knowledge and learning. What we know is one thing, he
suggested ; what we learn is some other thing. For empiricists, especially
those who take seriously the possibility of learning by induction, learn-
ing precedes knowledge, both psychologically and logically ; that is why
a solution to the problem of induction is a prerequisite to a solution of
the problem of demarcation. According to Popper, on the other hand,
knowledge must come first, and it is knowledge that is both the psy-
chological and logical antecedent of learning. We cannot begin to learn
anything if we do not already know something.
This is not intended to be a revival of the Platonic doctrine of
anamne¯sis, the doctrine that learning consists of recollecting what we
know already. Popper was enough of an empiricist to demand that expe-
rience must be relevant not only to the learning process but also to the
content of what we learn. What then can we learn through experience ?
Not what we already know, since we already know it, but — most simply
— the opposite of what we know ! Or, if you like to put it this way : the
principal thing that we learn is that we do not know. To take advantage
of the striking vocabulary that Popper later proposed [Popper 1963] : our
knowledge consists of conjectures, but the most important part of what
we learn consists of refutations ; that is, refutations of those conjectures.
The problem of demarcation can be solved in a satisfactory manner
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once we concede that what we call empirical knowledge cannot be know-
ledge in the traditional empiricist sense ; that is, it cannot be derived by
induction, or by any other method, from experience, but consists largely
of unsupported conjectures or guesses. As Kant recognized, knowledge
precedes experience. But that is not to say, as Kant came near to saying,
that such knowledge cannot be modified in the light of experience. This
indeed, Popper insisted, is the principal purpose of empirical investiga-
tion, and it is only knowledge that is susceptible to modification in the
light of experience that is genuinely open to empirical investigation. For
what could such an investigation be expected to achieve ? An empiri-
cal investigation turns up (or in the case of an experiment, may bring
into existence) singular facts. Either these facts — or more precisely, the
empirical reports that describe them — contradict the hypothesis being
investigated — these are refutations — or they are irrelevant to it —
these are sideshows — or they tell us something that we already know
— they confirm the conjecture. It should be evident that the second and
third types of fact do not make any difference — either they ignore the
hypothesis being investigated, or they repeat it (or some part of it). The
only useful purpose that can be served by investigating a hypothesis em-
pirically is, it seems, the acquisition of empirical evidence that refutes it.
But this implies that we cannot subject to any useful empirical invest-
igation a hypothesis that cannot be refuted by any empirical evidence.
This is Popper’s criterion of falsifiability, the criterion of demarcation
between science and non-science. Only those hypotheses that are empi-
rically refutable, or empirically falsifiable, can count as scientific.
Note two caveats. The criterion of demarcation as I have formulated
it here is a negative one, telling us what is not scientific. Given the Kant-
ian origin of the problem of demarcation, this is appropriate (though I
am not suggesting that Kant would have been satisfied with Popper’s
proposal). But as Agassi and others have remarked, the converse of the
criterion does not look right. A hypothesis may be empirically falsifiable
but not be something that we are interested in investigating empiri-
cally (though we could of course make it our business to investigate it) ;
and therefore not a part of what we usually call science. It is unhelp-
ful too to call scientific such activities as technology (see [Miller 2002,
§ 2]), which is incontrovertibly empirical, and history, which is also em-
pirical. If falsifiability is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for anything, a criterion of demarcation in the strict sense, it should
rather be between the empirical and the non-empirical. That that was
from the outset the distinction Popper was trying to capture is, I think,
plain from the declaration quoted above that ‘the main problem of philo-
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sophy is the critical analysis of the appeal to the authority of experience’
[Popper 1934, § 10]. It is admitted however that, no doubt for historical
reasons, Popper at times treated as identical the categories of the scien-
tific and the empirical. We must accordingly be careful, once we have
separated them, to place the criterion of demarcation in its proper home.
It has to be admitted too that, again for historical reasons, some of his
most prominent presentations of the problem of demarcation, such as
[Popper 1957, §§ If.], [Popper 1974, §§ 5–7], stress the demarcation be-
tween science and pseudoscience. But the difference between the scientific
and the empirical is not of great significance if, as in the present formula-
tion of the criterion of demarcation, we attend to the methods employed
rather than to the hypotheses proposed. This is surely what Popper set
out to do : ‘The theory of knowledge, whose task is the analysis of the
method or procedure peculiar to empirical science, may accordingly be
described as a theory of the empirical method’ [Popper 1934, § 5].
A second caveat is that falsifiable hypotheses may have unfalsifiable
consequences, and indeed all of them do ; logical truths inevitably, and
weak metaphysical statements in most cases (see [Popper 1934, § 78,
note ∗4], [Miller 1994, Chapter 1.2]). This no more compromises their
empirical character than does the presence of dead cells within its body
inevitably deprive a healthy organism of life.
The solution to the problem of induction is now a straightforward
task. We do indeed learn from experience, but what we learn is that
our hypotheses are false, not that they are true ; if an experimental or
observational result is in accordance with the hypothesis being investi-
gated, then we learn nothing from the investigation. This does not mean
that the investigation was a waste of time, any more than travel insur-
ance taken out in advance of an accident-free trip is a waste of money.
There is no need for any inductive inference from empirical evidence to
empirical generalization, and certainly no need to justify any such in-
ference, since a generalization may be added to our knowledge by being
freely conjectured. Our knowledge consists of unsupported conjectures,
our learning consists of refutations. Hume was right to suggest that in-
duction cannot be rationally justified, but wrong to say that what we
learn from experience is learnt irrationally.
These ideas, which form the backbone of Popper’s philosophy of
science, have been severely criticized. In [Miller 2006a, Chapter 4.4] I
have discussed some of the most popular criticisms. In this place I wish
rather to emphasize again the significance of the change of perspective
that Popper offered us, embodied in ‘the view that a hypothesis can
only be empirically tested — and only after it has been advanced’, as
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he put it at the beginning of [Popper 1959, § 1] (note that in the origi-
nal German edition [Popper 1934], and in later German editions, there
is nothing corresponding to these words). In the next section he went
on : ‘In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it
must already have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated
it, and submitted it to logical examination.’ That statements, theories,
hypotheses, conjectures, call them what you like, must be formulated
before they can be rationally evaluated may be a platitude. It is decisive
for much else besides.
Even though my wish in this paper is to explain Popper’s philosophy
of science rather than to undertake the criticism of alternatives, let me
conclude this section with a few words about how science is usually sup-
posed to be constituted. The orthodox view vigorously repudiates the
claim made above that facts that are predicted by a hypothesis do not
make any difference to it, since they do no more than repeat some part of
it ; it therefore repudiates the suggestion that the only point of submit-
ting a hypothesis to empirical investigation is to refute it. The orthodox
view amongst philosophers of science is that admission to science is in
reality a two-stage process, the first stage offering merely tentative or
provisional membership, while the second stage bestows full membership.
First tenure-track, then tenure. The idea seems to be that any testable
or falsifiable hypothesis qualifies at the first stage ; but only hypotheses
that survive rigorous testing qualify at the second. The first stage, which
inevitably involves some variant of Popper’s falsifiability criterion, plays
only a minor role, since what counts as genuine science is only what gets
through the qualifying rounds by undergoing and surviving sufficiently
austere scrutiny. Science, in other words, consists not just of any old fals-
ifiable hypotheses, but of falsifiable hypotheses that have passed tests,
or passed tests better than their rivals, so as to have earned the title of
being confirmed or justified or, in current jargon, warranted.
If a hypothesis could be conclusively verified by means of the testing
process, or through any other appeal to experience, then that would be
valuable information, for it would mean that no further investigation of
it would ever be necessary. But conclusive verification is generally accep-
ted to be impossible ; though not by [McGinn 2002, 49], who advises us
that ‘[i]t is not a tentative conjecture that water consists of H2O mole-
cules’ (yet samples of water often exhibit ionization of a rather complex
kind, and are not correctly described as collections of molecules of H2O).
What is put in its place, namely confirmation, or partial justification, or
partial warrant, is something very different. In Popper’s view, and also
in my own, the second stage of the supposed two-stage process plays no
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significant role (and is better thought of as not happening at all). For
once admitted to science a hypothesis is allowed to remain there unless
it is falsified (or, more subtly, it is replaced by something more general).
This applies as much to tenured hypotheses as to apprentices. The sur-
vival of rigorous tests does no more than maintain the status quo ante.
The award of tenure or of a warrant is therefore an utterly empty ges-
ture. It does nothing to protect a hypothesis against falsification later,
and in no respect makes it any less tentative. I do wish someone would
tell me why it is useful to know that a hypothesis has been confirmed, or
partially justified, or partially warranted, and in what way this implies
more than that it has not been refuted and has not been eliminated.
So strong is the general prejudice that if a statement is to be ration-
ally accepted, or rationally held, then it must have been obtained by
induction from the available evidence, that some authors have conclu-
ded that those who reject induction must prefer hypotheses that are
contradicted by the evidence to those that are not, or at least be indif-
ferent between them. An article in The New Scientist some twenty years
ago is illustrated with a drawing in which the table at which a man
is reading The Logic of Scientific Discovery ‘in the instant start[s] to
behave in a very un-table-like fashion’, losing its solidity [O’Hear 1985,
44]. The suggestion is that someone who takes Popper’s philosophy of
science seriously will expect all manner of unexpected things to happen ;
indeed, suffers all manner of unexpected things. In a similarly mocking
spirit [Okasha 2002, 26] contains four cartoons captioned ‘What happens
to people who don’t trust induction’. Two of the drawings are of men
behaving rather timidly in everyday circumstances, one showing fear as
he turns on his computer, the other wearing a gas mask as he opens
his front door. In the other drawings two men are shown behaving deci-
dedly imprudently : one preparing to fly from the roof of a building, the
other drinking poison. The message here is apparently that those who do
not take induction seriously will be both under-adventurous and over-
adventurous, neurotic and quixotic. They will not endorse commonsense
generalizations but will endorse generalizations that our current scient-
ific (and even commonsense) knowledge indicates to be foolish. I need
hardly say that these are crude misunderstandings. That a hypothesis
is accepted unsupported does not mean that it is accepted irrationally,
and it certainly does not mean that it is not accepted at all.
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3 First Philosophy
It is a central doctrine, indeed the central doctrine, of empiricism
that our knowledge of the world cannot be derived from first principles,
or a priori, but must be obtained from experience, or a posteriori. The
hopes of intellectualists (or rationalists, as they are often misleadingly
called) such as Descartes and Leibniz that we may be able to construct
a substantive theory of the world on purely abstract and philosophical
foundations, must be rejected (on logical grounds, if on no others). With
the stirring remark that ‘[t]here is . . . no first philosophy’ [Quine 1969,
p.127] signalled his extension of this doctrine from science to philosophy
itself. Philosophy, including philosophy of science and the theory of know-
ledge, is continuous with natural science, Quine suggested, and should
therefore be subject to the standards and the methods of investigation
that are current in natural science. This programme he announced under
the title of ‘naturalized epistemology’. It is clear from many of his later
writings that the science to which Quine wished to assimilate philosophy
most closely is cognitive psychology, and in this project he has been join-
ed, and, I need hardly add, anticipated, by a wide variety of thinkers.
A similar desire to diminish and even to erase the peculiar character of
philosophy, especially the philosophy of science, is evident in the myriad
attempts in the last 40 years or so to combine the philosophy of science
with the history of science, or with the sociology of science.
Popper would have none of it. A true philosopher, a true admirer of
natural science, and even an adherent to the idea that ‘there is no first
philosophy’, he rejected the inference that there is no genuine philosophy,
and that philosophy is at best a branch of science. He wrote in a passage
[Popper 1934, § 10] from which I quoted above several words :
The controversial question whether philosophy exists, or has
any right to exist, is almost as old as philosophy itself. Time
and again an entirely new philosophical movement arises
which finally unmasks the old philosophical problems as
pseudo-problems, and which confronts the wicked nonsense of
philosophy with the good sense of meaningful, positive, empi-
rical, science. And time and again do the despised defenders
of ‘traditional philosophy’ try to explain to the leaders of
the latest positivistic assault that the main problem of philo-
sophy is the critical analysis of the appeal to the authority of
experience — precisely that ‘experience’ which every latest
discoverer of positivism is, as ever, artlessly taking for grant-
ed. To such objections, however, the positivist only replies
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with a shrug : they mean nothing to him, since they do not
belong to empirical science, which alone is meaningful. ‘Ex-
perience’ for him is a programme, not a problem (unless it is
studied by empirical psychology).
Here in 1934 Popper was alluding to the anti-philosophical philosophy
promulgated by some members of the Vienna Circle. Although often
partisan supporters of the psychology and the sociology of science, most
members of the Circle had even less time for the history of science than
they had for its philosophy, which, after all, they practised despite them-
selves. But thirty years later a depressingly similar ‘entirely new philo-
sophical movement’ arose, fed this time by a newly-found fervour for
the illumination promised by the history of science. Popper had this to
say in a commentary [Popper, 1970, pp. 57f.] on the anti-philosophical
movement associated with [Kuhn 1962] :
. . . to me the idea of turning for enlightenment concerning
the aims of science, and its possible progress, to sociology or
to psychology (or . . . to the history of science) is surprising
and disappointing.
In fact, compared with physics, sociology and psychology are
riddled with fashions and with uncontrolled dogmas. [. . . ]
Besides, how can the regress to these often spurious sciences
help us in this particular difficulty ? Is it not sociological (or
psychological, or historical) science to which you want to ap-
peal in order to decide what amounts to the question ‘What
is science ?’. . . For clearly you do not want to appeal to the
sociological (or psychological, or historical) lunatic fringe . . .
The problem of demarcation, Popper insisted, cannot be settled by em-
pirical or scientific means, since there is no fact of the matter to be
settled. What is needed, he said is a proposal or (the words he used)
a convention or methodological rule concerning what falls within the
scope of scientific or empirical investigation. His first proposal was that
we should admit any hypothesis that is open in some way or other to
empirical falsification. A better one, soon spelt out by Popper himself,
inserts the proviso that any hypothesis admitted to science should have
been proposed in an attempt to solve some genuine problem or at least
to answer some genuine query, so that science will not be asked to make
room for testable hypotheses so idle and piﬄing that no one will ever
be concerned to put them to the test. This second proposal strengthens
the resolve, only implicit in the first one, that hypotheses that cannot
survive empirical testing ought to be rejected. An alternative suggestion
might be that we restrict admission to hypotheses thought up by people
The Objectives of Science 33
with established reputations in respectable scientific disciplines, a sug-
gestion that seems to be rather common amongst scientists anxious to
distinguish their own activities from those that they classify as pseudo-
science, yet is unenlightening (and would exclude many hypotheses of
interest and value). What clearly cannot be countenanced as a criterion
for admission to science is any rule that requires a hypothesis seeking
admission already to have been empirically investigated.
For the moment it suffices to observe that considerations such as
these cannot realistically be regarded as belonging to empirical science.
They are logical considerations or, if you like, a priori considerations.
Nonetheless, as Quine said, ‘[t]here is . . . no first philosophy’. The so-
lution to the problem of demarcation does not consist in deriving from
first principles the true character of science. Quine and other empiricists
are quite right to remind us that there is no a priori fount of knowledge,
quite right to remind us that, in philosophy as much as science, nothing
substantive can be generated by a priori considerations alone. But these
truisms, which are doubtless themselves fragments of a ‘first philosophy’,
do not imply that our knowledge of the world is obtained a posteriori,
from experience, nor that a priori considerations play no role. In fairness
to Quine, I should add that what he actually said was ‘[t]here is no exter-
nal vantage point, no first philosophy’, which could well be understood
naturalistically, to mean that no thinking takes place in the absence of
experience. This is a doctrine that, I imagine, Kant would have happily
consented to. But Quine’s context makes it evident that he advocates
the treatment of questions of the theory of knowledge as if they were
questions of natural science.
Popper, as we have seen, proposed that within science, and in other
empirical disciplines, our knowledge — that is, our hypotheses or conjec-
tures — are indeed produced prior to experience, that experience is then
brought to bear on them, and that what are genuinely a priori considera-
tions — namely that contradictions indicate the presence somewhere of
error — then lead us to abandon those conjectures that are contradicted
by the reports of experience (or in some cases, to scrutinize again those
reports). Much the same applies within philosophy itself, except that it
is not to experience that we look for counterexamples or refutations, but
(if anywhere) to the philosophical problems that provoked them [Popper
1958, § 2]. In the case of the problem of demarcation, we may consider
and evaluate, in a largely a priori manner, various proposals about how
best to conduct scientific inquiry. Let me be more explicit : it is a logic-
al or a priori matter whether any credit accrues to a hypothesis that
survives a severe battery of tests, though it is of course a psychologic-
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al matter whether such survival may have a tendency to increase the
confidence that a believer in the hypothesis places in it. Like any other
human activity in the world, science can be investigated by psychologic-
al and sociological methods. We all agree about that. What partisans
of naturalized epistemology have failed to make clear is why there can
exist no further logicalcal considerations.
It can be admitted that pure logic is not informative about the world,
and that logical truths presented to us a priori tell us nothing of interest.
But once we appreciate that a conjecture must always comes first, that
‘[i]n order that a statement may be logically examined . . . , it must al-
ready have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated it, and
submitted it to logical examination’, we can see that the correct prin-
ciple that ‘[t]here is . . . no first philosophy’ is by no means equivalent
to the fallacious principle ‘there is no genuine philosophy’. In the pre-
sence of an interesting conjecture, the identification of a contradiction
may be a genuinely informative contribution — for it may inform us
that the conjecture is incorrect — even though the contradiction itself,
considered abstractly, is of no real interest. Where Quine and others have
gone astray, I think, is in implicitly supposing that the purpose of ratio-
nal thought is fundamentally constructive or productive ; that is to say,
that philosophical doctrines must either be derived from experience or
be derived from first principles ; and since first principles yield nothing
of interest, only experience is left. But there is a third option : philo-
sophical doctrines, like scientific hypotheses, are nor derived at all. They
are invented. The philosophical work — or, in the case of scientific hypo-
theses, the scientific work — comes later, in evaluating them as solutions
to the problems that they attempt to solve. Problems of the theory of
knowledge can be tackled by conjectural means. There is indeed a special
difficulty in the theory of knowledge or methodology, which is much less
pressing in the case of metaphysical speculation, if it is maintained that
methodological rules are not factual, and have the status of conventions.
But it can be only the absurd doctrine that all conventions are arbitrary
conventions that can lead to the idea that the best that methodologists
can do is to describe what scientists do.
Although Popper may well be right that the ‘pronouncements of a
theory of method . . . are . . . for the most part conventions of a fairly
obvious kind . . . [and] [p]rofound truths are not to be expected of method-
ology’ [Popper 1959, 54], it hardly follows that methodology consists of
a system of logical truths or empty recommendations. What we consider
a good method is at least in part affected by what we regard as the aims
of scientific activity. Nonetheless, I am inclined to agree that in method-
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ology we have learnt rather more than we know. We have learnt through
criticism that many proposals are unsatisfactory, and not much remains
in our stock of methodological knowledge except the nearly truistic state-
ment that since we do not know what to look for when we investigate the
unknown, we should be ready to try out every conjecture that we can
formulate sufficiently precisely to make criticism possible [Miller 2006b].
We cannot do better than this, since it does not prohibit us from trying
anything, but of course we might do worse. For example, we might stand
and wait for a message from Heaven. This is not prohibited either, but
it is not ‘try[ing] out every conjecture that we can formulate sufficiently
precisely’.
Naturalized epistemology has sources other than Quine, the Vienna
Circle, and Kuhn, of course, but it is largely Quine’s variant that has
interested me here. My point is that Quine is quite right in ‘asking us
to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology’
[Kim 1988, § 3], but quite wrong therefore to dismiss the possibility of
‘normative epistemology’. Nor need we, like Kim himself, an opponent
of Quine’s on this point, make the concession that ‘epistemological su-
pervenience is what underlies our belief in the possibility of normative
epistemology’ or admit that methodology has to be subject to ‘natural-
istic criteria’ [Kim 1988, § 7]. What makes a theory about the natural
world a good theory, namely its truth or closeness to the truth, is no
doubt reducible to features of the world. But what makes a method
a good method is not a natural property, but a logical property, and
deserves to be recognized as such.
4 Objectivism
My first point about objectivism is solely a disclaimer. Nothing said
here should be taken as relating to the philosophy of Ayn Rand, which
is also known as objectivism. It would not be surprising if there were
similarities between some of Popper’s views and some of Rand’s. It is a
simple theorem of logic that however much two thinkers may appear to
disagree, they agree on exactly half the points on which they both have
opinions.3
3Suppose that Mr A’s opinions are summed up in the theory A, and Mrs C’s
opinions are summed up in C. Then the theory A ∨ C sums up the points of agree-
ment. Let b be some proposition on which Mr A and Mrs C disagree, and y be any
proposition on which they both have opinions. If y is a point of agreement, then the
biconditional b ↔ y is another point of disagreement. But if y is a point of disagree-
ment, then b ↔ y is a point of agreement (since ¬X ↔ ¬Z has the same truth value
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Let us begin with objective knowledge. Nobody denies that scientists
are individual people, with the usual facility of being in individual ways
in a variety of psychological states, in particular the psychological states
of belief, doubt, and understanding. These psychological states come
in degrees : one can believe more or else tenaciously, doubt more or less
intensely, understand more or less completely ; perhaps also believe more
or less confidently, doubt more or less hesitantly, understand more or less
deeply. One may also be more or less consciously aware of the presence
of the belief, doubt, or understanding. Like other more obviously phys-
ical and better-regulated dispositions, such as colour-blindness, perfect
pitch, and the ability to distinguish Château Lafite from Château Latour,
an individual’s psychological states inevitably have some effect on the
way that he or she behaves, on what he or she attends to, on what he
or she hears or sees. But in the normal run of things, these subjective
phenomena are not of much public interest. Although they can be expect-
ed to influence a discussion or an investigation, usually in unexpected
ways, they are not what constitute the subject matter of most public
discussions and investigations. When we discuss the world we live in, or
our involvement in it, we are not interested in the beliefs and doubts
of our fellow discussants in the sense that these beliefs and doubts are
subjective states. We are interested only in things that can be shared.
Now what is called the content of a belief, in contrast to its presence,
what gives it its individuality and its point, may also be idiosyncratic ;
but if it is, then we shall not be interested in the contents of others’ beliefs
either, but in something more abstract. These more abstract objects are
for the most part (but not invariably) formulated in the sentences of a
shared language. That the sentences themselves are then understood in
idiosyncratic ways by those who hear or read them does not in the least
detract from the fact that they are objective in the ways that beliefs,
and the individual contents of beliefs, are not. It may be something of a
miracle that we manage to understand each other, that we can command
intersubjective understanding, and sometimes even agreement ; but we
as X ↔ Z). In addition, b ↔ (b ↔ y) is logically equivalent to y. In other words the
function that associates y with b ↔ y is a bijection from A ∨ C, the set of propositions
on which Mr A and Mrs C agree, to the set of propositions on which they disagree.
Points of agreement should therefore be expected all over the place, and we are well
advised not to take them too seriously.
This is a simple variant of the proof presented in [Miller 1994, Chapter 10.4a] of the
theorem of Keuth and Vetter that the truth content and falsity content of a theory
are equipollent. It has as a simple consequence the main theorem of [Harris 1974],
to the effect that Popper’s theory of closeness to the truth does not apply to false
theories even if ‘the truth’ is represented by an arbitrary, not necessarily maximal,
theory C. For a comment what Harris did and did not discover, see [Miller 2005, § 1].
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do, and we do understand each other sufficiently well at times to disagree
with each other.
Scientists, being human, are no different, even in scientific contexts.
What scientists observe is equally at the mercy of subjective factors,
some of them idiosyncratic, some of them widespread but nonetheless
subjective. What scientists (except for human psychologists) are inter-
ested in are not the private psychological processes of their colleagues,
but those parts of the contents of these processes that can be formulated
in language. Science concerns itself, as we have already repeatedly no-
ted, with linguistically formulated statements, hypotheses and theories.
Scientific knowledge consists of such linguistic entities. When entertained
by some mind, the statements we consider may be prey to any number of
subjective embellishments. Nonetheless as statements they are objective
public items and they belong to no one in particular.
This is what Popper calls our objective knowledge. Most of science is
objective knowledge in this sense. It is neither psychological nor physical,
though it invariably appears to us in a psychological or physical form :
as a thought, as a speech, in a book. But the mode of physical or psy-
chological presentation is not what is scientifically interesting. What we
strive for, to be sure, are formulations that are capable of withstanding
the excesses of idiosyncratic interpretation. That may be why scientific
language is often dry and rather literal, avoiding figurative language that
may (but of course may not) impede ready understanding. The form in
which an idea is presented may be likened to the material in which cough
mixture is packaged. We want a material that keeps it intact — asbestos
is better than cardboard — and interacts with it as little as possible
— glass is better than asbestos — but it is the cough mixture that is
important. The bottle is not.
If the subjective influences on what we think, and the subjective ef-
fects that our thoughts have on their bearers (and on those to whom they
are communicated) are not important, then what is important about
the hypotheses that they embody ? In short, what are we investigating ?
Popper hardly has any claim to originality in maintaining that it is the
objective truth values (the truth or the falsity) of our hypotheses that
are our principal concern. We test hypotheses in various ways because
we think, rightly or wrongly, that the results that we obtain from pro-
perly conducted tests can sometimes indicate that our hypotheses are
false, though (Hume taught us) never that they are true. Perhaps we are
wrong to think this ; perhaps there are more things wrong with tradi-
tional empiricism than its mistaken doctrine that experience impresses
ideas on our minds. It may be that few of the observational and exper-
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imental reports published in scientific journals are literally true. I can
only say that this hypothesis is itself open to empirical test.
Some will no doubt protest that if science offers us only empirical me-
thods for testing statements about the accuracy of empirical methods,
then empiricism is self-reinforcing, and the tests are no more convincing
than two dubious witnesses in court who support each other’s testimony.
This cannot be denied, but it is an elementary logical mistake to suppose
that it is relevant to what I said. Of course empirical methods cannot
show empirical methods to have a proclivity to generate objectively true
observational and experimental reports. But it may be that they can
show that some methods are rather bad at doing this, and that is what I
was talking about. In this way we have been pressed to formulate hypo-
theses about colour blindness and about other perceptual idiosyncrasies,
and to require double-blind testing in many parts of human (and even
animal) psychology. There is no crasser logical error persistently commit-
ted by otherwise clear thinkers than the confusion of circular arguments,
which assume what they want to establish, and therefore establish no-
thing, and critical (or reductio ad absurdum) arguments, which assume
the negation of what they want to establish [Miller 1996, § 1]. I do not say
that empirical methods can show empirical methods to have a proclivity
to generate objectively true observational and experimental reports. I
do say that they can show that empirical methods sometimes produce
contradictory results.
Perhaps I should be cautious here. There is one other most regrettable
logical mistake that is commonly committed, the mistake of supposing
that because our language, and our thoughts, are imbued with unspoken
theories and prejudices, because we are always looking at things from
an unarticulated perspective, because all our language too embodies a
point of view, it follows that it is not possible to make statements that
are objectively true and false. This conclusion is false. It would be like
arguing from the premise that, in order to describe points and events in
space and time, we are obliged to fix, in a more or less arbitrary manner,
a set of coordinate axes and an origin, to the conclusion that we cannot
make statements that are independent of these coordinate systems. To
describe the orbits of the planets Venus and Mars we may need to refer
them to some set of axes. If the origin of coordinates is at the centre
of the Sun, the orbits will be described as approximate ellipses ; if the
origin is the centre of Venus, the orbit of Venus will be described very
differently. That much may be admitted, though the two descriptions
are intertranslatable, and only superficially different. But however we
describe the two orbits, whatever coordinate system we refer the motions
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to, these two orbits do not intersect. They may appear to intersect ; that
is, their projections on to the surface of the celestial sphere may intersect.
That is not the same thing.
There is a widespread view that the world itself, independently of
the language that we use to describe it, has (or at least may have) a
determinate structure. As a consequence, some languages are thought
to be more appropriate than others. People talk of ‘cutting reality at
its joints’. I have no doubt that this takes realism too far. The world
has any number of different structures, depending on how we choose
to describe it. We can depict it as a group, or as a lattice, or in any
number of different ways. Structural realism is a fallacious doctrine if
it asserts the objectivity of structures. Yet the objectivity of truth is
not compromised. Conceptual or expressive relativity is indeed perfectly
compatible with alethic absoluteness. By all means talk, as many do, of
mind-dependent reality, if you mean only that every descriptive language
embodies a point of view. Do not suppose that truth is mind-dependent
too.
From 1935 until the end of his life Popper championed the relevance
to the theory of knowledge of the classical theory of truth as it was
formulated by Tarski, who, he claimed, rehabilitated and demystified
the classical idea of truth as correspondence to the facts, an idea that is
both absolute and objective, properties that Popper usually identified.
To take the stock example, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only
if snow is white. It may be, of course, that only from an incongruously
specialized viewpoint could anyone be led to formulate such a sequence
of words as ‘Snow is white’, yet the incongruously specialized viewpoint
is not what the sentence is about ; and although it may be only from
that viewpoint that it is possible to state the conditions under which the
statement is true, that it meets those conditions is independent of the
viewpoint. I do not want to defend everything that Popper said about
Tarski’s theory of truth, but on this point I think that he was absolutely
correct [Miller 1999a].
5 Conclusion
It seems to have been a disregard for, or an obliviousness to, the dif-
ference between objective truth and warranted truth that has led to the
doctrine that there is no objective or absolute truth. You still hear people
assert that all truth is relative, meaning no more than that no truth can
be established with certainty. I have indicated above that Popper’s view,
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which I share and perhaps even go beyond, was that our knowledge not
only is not certain, it does not receive, and does not need, a jot of ob-
jective warrant from the fragmentary empirical evidence that we have.
This view is shared also by those who call themselves social construc-
tivists, who have seen through the traditional epistemological protesta-
tions that, despite all that Hume said, there is a positive solution to the
problem of induction. Critical rationalists and post-structuralists are at
one in agreeing that this is logicall and epistemological wishful thinking
at best, and in some cases simply bluster. But critical rationalists re-
ject absolutely the untenable doctrine that because objective warrant is
a prize not worth struggling for, so too is objective truth. We go fur-
ther, and dismiss as an unworthy goal even that kind of local, relative,
culture-specific, or subjective justification that many social constructi-
vists appear to admire [Miller 1999b]. It is appropriate, I hope, to end in
this way this tribute to the memory of Karl Popper by so accentuating
what separates his philosophy from the various systems of his contemp-
oraries, and to underline again the significance of the way in which his
philosophy unites the best elements of both empiricist and intellectualist
thought.
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